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Response

How Many Wrongs Make a Copyright?
Rebecca Tushnet

†

INTRODUCTION
Derek Bambauer’s provocative paper starts with a normative proposition: the remedies available to people who suffer
unconsented distribution of intimate images of themselves, of1
ten known as revenge porn, are insufficient. Bambauer is especially critical of the secondary liability regime for privacy
2
torts. At (First Amendment-inflected) common law, it is hard
to hold distributors liable for such harm, and Congress has
made it impossible online by enacting § 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which provides total immunity to a service
3
provider uninvolved in developing tortious content. Copy4
right’s remedies, Bambauer observes, are much broader. And
the lack of ability to control distribution is a disincentive for at
least some people to create intimate pictures, even though the
creation of intimate pictures might otherwise have social utility. Because copyright is justified as a means of incentivizing
creation, but mostly because its remedies are good ones, we
should therefore call the harm done by unconsented distribu5
tion of intimate images “copyright harm.”
Bambauer is not the first to notice that copyright’s remedies are far broader than those associated with other rights to
control information. Some victims of unconsented distribution
of intimate images have already turned to copyright claims—
† Thanks to James Grimmelmann for helpful discussions and Rob
McCabe for research assistance. Copyright © 2014 by Rebecca Tushnet.
[Editor’s Note: This is a response to Derek Bambauer, Exposed, 98 MINN.
L. REV. 2025 (2014).]
1. See generally Derek Bambauer, Exposed, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2025
(2014).
2. Id. at 2054.
3. See id. at 2028.
4. Id. at 2052–56.
5. Id. at 2039–44.
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mostly celebrities to date, but we can imagine more ordinary
6
folks doing so as well. Likewise, trademark owners have made
copyright claims when trademark’s remedies have proved in7
sufficient for their desires. So have victims of negative reviews,
8
circumventing defamation’s strict limits on liability. Of course,
those limits—like trademark’s limits—are there for a reason,
and so too with the privacy torts generally thought most apposite to the harm done by unconsented distribution of intimate
images.
So how should we think about Bambauer’s proposal? As
Part I of this Response details, the proposal requires significant
changes to every part of copyright—what copyright seeks to encourage, who counts as an author/owner, what counts as an exclusive right, what qualifies as infringement, what suffices as a
9
defense, and what remedies are available.
6. See generally Rebecca Tushnet, Performance Anxiety: Copyright Embodied and Disembodied, 60 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 209 (2013).
7. See, e.g., Euro-Excellence, Inc. v. Kraft Can., Inc., [2007] 3 S.C.R. 20
(Can.) (rejecting trademark owner’s attempt to use copyright to evade limits
on trademark rights); Jennifer M. Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or
“Chilling Effects”? Takedown Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 621, 668–
70, 678 (2006) (discussing noncopyright claims framed as copyright claims for
purposes of benefiting from DMCA (Digital Millennium Copyright Act)
takedown procedures); Fax from Creative Crystal Co. to Google, Inc. (Aug. 22,
2003), available at http://www.chillingeffects.org/dmca512/notice.cgi?Notice
ID=842 (requesting takedown of sites which use Creative Crystal’s registered
trademarks “in meta tags and keywords up to 39 times on one page”); Letter
from Sarah B. Deutsch, Vice President and Gen. Counsel for Verizon
Commc’ns, Inc., to the U.S. Copyright Office 2 (Nov. 28, 2011), available at
http://www.copyright.gov/docs/onlinesp/comments/2011/initial/verizon.pdf (noting DMCA notices sent on trademark grounds); Rebecca Tushnet, INTA:
Pharma Panel and Keyword Panel, REBECCA TUSHNET’S 43(B)LOG (May 8,
2012),
http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2012/05/inta-pharma-panel-and-keyword
-panel.html (discussing trademark counsel’s advice to claim copyright in logos
and other marks in order to expand rights).
8. See, e.g., Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, Inc., 336 F.2d 303, 3–5
(2d Cir. 1966) (describing how Rosemont tried to suppress a biography by buying copyrights of quoted articles); Eric Goldman, Ripoff Report Ordered to Stop
Publishing User-Submitted Report—Giordano v. Romeo, TECH. & MKTG. L.
BLOG (Jan. 4, 2011), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2011/01/ripoff_
report_o.htm (discussing case where a business sued critic for defamation and
acquired copyright in critical post, then sent copyright takedown); Eric Goldman, You Shouldn’t Need a Copyright Lawyer to Pick a Dentist—Lee v.
Makhnevich (Forbes Cross-Post), TECH. & MKTG. L. BLOG (Apr. 23, 2013),
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2013/04/you_shouldnt_ne.htm (explaining
how some professionals have attempted to use copyright to remove negative
online reviews).
9. See infra Part I.
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Part II argues that these differences are not merely defini10
tional. They go to the effects of the law as well as its goals. Incentivizing intimacy is not the same thing as incentivizing creativity. The motivations that induce people to create and share
intimate images are unlikely to be affected by a change in copyright law that both creators and abusive disseminators are extremely unlikely to understand. Copyright works, when it
works, as incentive for economically motivated creators; it handles the non-economically motivated poorly, and it has no real
mechanism for communicating its rules to the laypeople engaged in the bulk of the behavior Bambauer wishes to change.
Misunderstood penalties will neither incent nor deter as hoped.
Bambauer nonetheless argues that the harm he targets is
close enough to copyright harm that the right he wants to grant
can fairly be called a copyright right, because copyright—
particularly copyright’s concept of authorship—is normatively
11
empty and can be filled any way we want to fill it. He points
to the inconsistencies and special pleading that abound in the
current statute, and argues that adding a sexting epicycle to
the current scheme wouldn’t make a difference worth protest12
ing. I disagree, because of the profound misfit between every
aspect of copyright and the interests at issue here.
Bambauer’s true target is the secondary liability rules for
privacy violations, particularly § 230 of the Communications
13
Decency Act. He argues that intermediaries should be subject
to legal constraints for enabling the unconsented dissemination
of intimate media, and that the intermediary liability he envi14
sions would be constitutional if based out of Title 17. I believe
that avoiding privacy law’s secondary liability regime by calling
the proposed cause of action “copyright” is a mistake. If the secondary liability rules are wrong and there should be a notice
and takedown scheme for revenge porn—something I’m open to
agreeing with—then they should be changed, not evaded. If the
secondary liability rules are right, they should not be evaded.
And the collateral damage from evasion should not be excused
by claiming that copyright is already bollixed.
Ultimately, I can’t agree that we ought to be realists when
it comes to escaping § 230 and formalists when it comes to
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

See infra Part II.
See Bambauer, supra note 1, at 2052–56.
Id. at 2076.
Id. at 2084–91.
Id.
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evaluating the constitutionality of something labeled “copyright.” Bambauer argues both that the label “copyright” matters, because copyright is about something in particular and
because violations of its exclusive rights deserve particular
remedies, and also that the label is just a move in a language
15
game. Inconsistency is no great vice, but it’s no virtue either.
The case for a new intellectual property (or more properly, privacy or dignity) right for people depicted in intimate photos and
videos could most persuasively be made on its own merits.
I. WHY CALL IT COPYRIGHT?
Copyright, though it has many complex and reticulated
niches, has a general structure. Pamela Samuelson has recently undertaken a valuable taxonomic project on copyrightable
subject matter, articulating criteria based on the history of and
policies underlying copyright law for what should and shouldn’t
be brought into the copyright regime (e.g., gardens, yoga, DNA
16
sequences). While some of her criteria aren’t very relevant to
Bambauer’s proposal, because he deals with photos and video
that are already copyrightable subject matter and instead pro17
poses to change authorship and rights definitions, several
others provide useful guidance. She suggests that, when considering an expansion of copyright law, we should consider the
fit between copyright’s economic justification and the economic/incentive structure of the subject matter sought to be protected, specifically whether legal protection will spur investment into the production of multiple copies for the purpose of
18
sale. We should also consider the fit between the subject matter and the legal structure of copyright:
This includes the appropriateness of the exclusive rights, the duration
of rights, infringement standards, and copyright remedies, as well as
15. Id. at 2056–58.
16. See generally Pamela Samuelson, Are Gardens, Synthetic DNA, Yoga
Sequences, and Fashions Copyrightable? (Feb. 1, 2013) (unpublished draft) (on
file with author).
17. For example, the question of how long the subject matter at issue has
existed and whether changed circumstances justify an expansion of copyright
is less relevant to Bambauer’s proposal than to DNA sequences, as is whether
the works communicate expressive content. Id. at 22.
18. Id. at 21. Relatedly, she suggests evaluating the similarity of creators
and creative outputs in the proposed subject matter to the creators and creative outputs of conventional copyrightable works: “[T]he greater the mismatch
in these respects, the more likely it is that an extension of copyright to new
subject matters will cause distortions or result in misapplications that will
undermine the integrity of the copyright regime.” Id. at 22.
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copyright doctrines, such as the idea/expression distinction, the
scenes a faire and merger, fair use and first sale, classroom and other
performance limitations, and the procedures by which copyright infringement is judged. Often proponents of an expansion in copyright
subject matter focus on a subset of the features of copyright’s legal regime, while ignoring respects in which a mismatch exists. While special rules can sometimes be developed to adjust the fit in copyright
law, the legal regime fit should be an important criterion in judging
19
whether subject matter expansion is a sound idea.

In line with Samuelson’s framework, the following subsections explore what Bambauer proposes to change—which turns
out to be pretty much every aspect of copyright. The overall effect is that the right he wants to create can’t be called “copyright” under any current meaning of the term.
A. WHAT IS THE INCENTIVE-BASED JUSTIFICATION FOR THE
RIGHT?
The subject matter of copyright has traditionally been limited by the concept of encouraging creation of expression, not
just creation more generally. The threat of underproduction of
an intangible value is addressed many different ways in law.
Patent, design patent, trade secret, trademark dilution, and the
right of publicity all, at least according to their proponents,
seek to encourage production by giving owners a right to ex20
clude.
As noted by Bambauer and others, the right of privacy can
also be seen to protect incentives generated by exclusive con21
trol. The question is—control over what? The answer usually
allows us to identify the category of legal right at issue. When
we want the creator to have control over innovation, the relevant law is patent or trade secret. When we want the creator to
have control over marketing value, the relevant law is trademark dilution or the right of publicity. Bambauer proposes to
shift the locus of control over intimate expression from the
right of privacy to copyright, but identifying “incentives” for

19. Id. at 21–22.
20. See, e.g., Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 524 (1871) (design patent); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct.
2107 (2013) (patent); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39
cmt. a (1995) (trade secret); 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY & PRIVACY § 2.2 (1987) (right of publicity); William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 308–
09 (1987) (trademark dilution).
21. See Bambauer, supra note 1, at 2088–91.
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“production” in general doesn’t justify putting anything into the
22
copyright category in particular.
Privacy, and the related ability to control the presentation
23
of one’s self, support the development of that self. Privacy
provides a space for experimentation, self-discovery, and intimacy, all of which are goods worth having. Intimate media,
Bambauer argues, can further these missions of self-discovery
and intimate communication, and therefore incentivizing the
creation of intimate media fits within copyright’s incentive par24
adigm. Tangible indicia of intimacy and self-discovery, however, are valuable to self-development not because they are tangible, and not because they contain creative expression—those
are just incidental phenomena related to the fact that modern
Americans live digital, mediated lives—but rather because they
support this private, desiring, intimate self. As a result, the incentives Bambauer wishes to provide are not directed at generating expression fixed in a tangible medium, the traditional—
25
and constitutionally required—subject matter of copyright.
Privacy’s intimacy-promoting goals would be equally wellserved by (1) protecting nonexpressive/factual intimate communications, including communications too basic or standard to
be deemed protectable by copyright under conventional copyright doctrine, and by (2) protecting unfixed communications
such as real-time telephone conversations, video chats, or even
face-to-face gossip.
The examples Bambauer uses also show that the targeted
harm is not about expression, but rather about the social meaning of exposure (especially for women):
22. Id. at 2091.
23. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904,
1906 (2013) (“Privacy is shorthand for breathing room to engage in the processes of boundary management that enable and constitute selfdevelopment.”); Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV.
477, 532 (2006) (“The risk of disclosure can prevent people from engaging in
activities that further their own self-development.”).
24. I therefore find it curious that Bambauer argues that privacy theory
does not recognize the benefits of intimate media. See Bambauer, supra note 1,
at 2088. His description seems to me to fit very well into a discourse about the
benefits of privacy, which include intimate interactions.
25. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (allowing Congress to protect
“[w]ritings” of “[a]uthors,” both terms with arguable limiting force); 17 U.S.C.
§ 102(a) (2012) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in
original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . . .”);
Feist Publ’ns, Inc., v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991) (“Originality is a constitutional requirement . . . . [O]riginality requires independent
creation plus a modicum of creativity . . . .”).
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A female Yale Law School student targeted by defamatory attacks,
including about her intimate life, on the AutoAdmit web site did not
obtain a single summer job offer during on-campus recruiting with
law firms . . . . A student teacher was denied a degree in education after inadvertently revealing a MySpace photo that showed her drinking an alcoholic beverage while wearing a pirate costume. A Georgia
high school teacher was forced to resign after a parent gained access
to her Facebook profile and found a photo of her holding a pint of beer
and glass of wine during a trip to Europe. In Florida, a high school
English teacher was also pressed into quitting her job after her principal found photos of her modeling swimsuits, under a different name,
online. Finally, Citibank terminated a female employee simply because she was judged to be both attractive and given to wearing
26
clothes that accentuated her appeal.

Notice that all these examples involve gender role enforcement (including concerns about women’s public consumption of alcohol), but not intimate media. That Bambauer rightly
identifies them as part of the same problem as nonconsensual
distribution of intimate media indicates that the harm is some27
thing different than what his proposed solution targets. “Revenge porn employs the darker part of the human emotional
28
spectrum: shame, humiliation, fear, and disgust,” and it is
that source of harm that privacy/dignity-based torts target. By
contrast, copyright usually refuses to recognize harm to the
copyright owner’s dignity as a source of actionable harm: Anne
29
Rice may feel personally assaulted by bad reviews or parodies,
but that’s just too bad for her unless the attack rises to the level of defamation or intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Bambauer’s proposal would give copyright new missions:
incentivize the creation of intimacy and prevent harms from
exposure, mainly harms suffered by women. These might well
be valid goals, but not ones that fit copyright’s contours.
B. WHO COUNTS AS THE AUTHOR/OWNER OF THE RIGHT?
Bambauer’s proposed right is not a conventional authorship right. Instead of the author of the fixed work—the person
or persons who contributed sufficient copyrightable creativity
and exercised sufficient control over the final work—being the
26. See Bambauer, supra note 1, at 2040–41 (footnotes omitted).
27. Cf. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method and the
State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 365, 365–68 (1982) (noting
that sexualized advertising does the same kind of harm as pornography).
28. See Bambauer, supra note 1, at 2043 (footnote omitted).
29. Sarah Lyall, The People Have Spoken, and Rice Takes Offense, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 11, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/11/books/11rice.html?_
r=1&.
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copyright owner, the subject would own a “copyright” interest
under Bambauer’s model. Each subject would enjoy a right to
prevent distribution of intimate media, even as against the per30
son who would otherwise be deemed the copyright owner. This
31
new right would apparently cover all “intimate media,” but
the proposed definition doesn’t include any requirement that
the media have been created with intent to limit distribution.
Thus, it would appear to work a profound change in the default
ownership rules for pornography as well as for any other photos
and video containing sexually explicit elements, something one
might imagine both the adult entertainment and the mainstream film/TV industry might wish to weigh in on before en32
actment.
Also unlike a regular copyright right, the intimate media
33
right would be waivable (in writing), but not alienable. Copyrights can presently be licensed nonexclusively based on oral
34
agreements or by implication from the parties’ conduct.
30. See Bambauer, supra note 1, at 2058 (describing that the proposal
would “curtail the distribution and display rights enjoyed by the copyright
owner of intimate media”). It is also unclear whether this new interest would
affect the copyright term, which for works not created as works for hire is life
of the author plus seventy years. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012). Logically, we could
treat the new copyright owner the same way we treat joint authors—the term
of a joint work is the life of the longest-surviving author plus seventy years.
Id. § 302(b).
31. Bambauer, supra note 1, at 2056.
32. Bambauer proposes that this right will be waivable in writing, but
that’s not sufficient for the modern film industry, which universally seeks
work-for-hire status so that the funding/producing entity is deemed the author
of the work from the outset. See id. at 2073. Among other things, a mere copyright transfer from the performer is terminable after thirty-five years. See 17
U.S.C. § 203 (2012). Perhaps Bambauer means that waiver should not be considered a “transfer” and therefore not terminable; if so, his proposal has yet
another point of divergence from current copyright law. No court would allow
the use of the term “waiver” to defeat § 203 termination rights in other circumstances; § 203 was designed to be unwaivable. Cf. Marvel Characters, Inc.
v. Simon, 310 F.3d 280, 282 (2d Cir. 2002) (finding that an after-the-fact
agreement that a work was a work for hire is an unenforceable “agreement to
the contrary” that can’t prevent termination given Congress’s intent to protect
authors). Or perhaps Bambauer would allow the creation of works for hire
outside the scope of this new right, which for nonemployees would require
(1) a written agreement, and (2) that the work fall within the enumerated
statutory categories of works that can be works for hire. See 17 U.S.C. § 101
(2012). In the case of standalone photographs, this might prove a bit tricky,
since it’s hard to jam photos into any of those categories, but for films and photos intended for inclusion in magazines and the like it could probably be done
with relative ease.
33. See Bambauer, supra note 1, at 2059.
34. See, e.g., Effects Assocs. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 558 (9th Cir. 1990).
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Bambauer’s rule for intimate media would require a written
35
agreement even for a nonexclusive license. Likewise, because
one problem that arises in intimate media is that one member
of a couple shares a sex tape featuring both of them, waiver by
one participant would not waive others’ rights, again in contrast to existing law, including the existing moral rights provi36
sions in the Copyright Act; presently, joint authors can grant
nonexclusive licenses without the consent of other joint au37
thors.
C. WHAT QUALIFIES AS INFRINGEMENT?
Bambauer proposes that the owner of the intimate media
38
right would have the right to prevent distribution of the work.
This right would apparently not be the right to authorize distribution without the consent of the person who would ordinarily be considered the copyright owner, but a purely prohibitory
right. So, if the subject wasn’t also the cameraperson, she
wouldn’t by herself be able to authorize distribution. By contrast, existing copyright rights are rights to authorize, not just
rights to prohibit; as noted in the previous section, joint au39
thors can grant licenses without other authors’ consent. It is
not clear whether this negative right would have the same duration as a copyright (currently life plus seventy years).
In addition, the intimate media right would go beyond the
current § 106 right to control public performance and display
and create a new right to control private performance and dis40
play. The right would thus cover instances in which a recipient called his friends over to look at the image on his phone,
which again sounds more like a privacy right than a copyright.
35. See Bambauer, supra note 1, at 2059–60.
36. Id.; see also 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012) (granting limited moral rights of
attribution and integrity to certain works of visual art); id. (providing that
joint authors are co-owners of these moral rights).
37. See Bambauer, supra note 1, at 2038 (“Even if a participant were
deemed a joint author of the intimate media [under existing law], she would be
powerless to prevent her co-author from giving permission for the work’s use,
regardless of her wishes.”).
38. Id. at 2058. Bambauer also proposes that only actual images should be
covered. Id. at 2094. I’m not sure this definition would be likely to survive the
drafting process—why not also cover avatars? The interest in them, especially
as they improve in verisimilitude, is likely to be similar, and the right of publicity has similarly expanded to cover virtual representations. See, e.g., Hart v.
Elec. Arts, 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013).
39. See supra Part I.B.
40. See Bambauer, supra note 1, at 2093.
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D. WHAT ARE THE DEFENSES TO INFRINGEMENT?
Bambauer proposes to eliminate the existing defenses to
copyright infringement for intimate media, including most notably fair use, though presumably the exceptions for educational institutions, nonprofit performances, etc. would also all have
41
to go.
Because the “intimate media” definition would cover all
sexual photos and visuals, even if they were created for distribution, this could have significant effects on fair use cases,
42
which often involve sexuality. Consider the recent and already
43
influential case Prince v. Cariou, in which appropriation artist
Richard Prince took photos of Rastafarians and combined them
44
with images of naked women taken from soft-core magazines:

The photographer mostly lost his infringement claim because the use was transformative, bringing new messages and
new meanings to the original photos. But under Bambauer’s
new rule, the models portrayed in the soft-core magazines
would have a valid infringement claim (against Prince and
against me) because they didn’t consent to Prince’s use.

41. See id. at 2068.
42. See Rebecca Tushnet, My Fair Ladies: Sex, Gender, and Fair Use in
Copyright, 15 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L., 273, 278–79 (2007).
43. Prince v. Cariou, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013).
44. Richard Prince, Djuana Barnes (2008), displayed at The Gagosian
Gallery.
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Bambauer offers a slightly different scenario:
Consider an artist who uses a photograph of his naked partner in his
artwork—perhaps he is mashing up Soviet-era propaganda images
with nude photos. That display of the intimate photo is highly transformative, pushing the analysis towards finding the use fair. But, this
is irrelevant to his partner, who may not want the photo displayed,
regardless of its artsy surroundings. The possibility of being involun45
tarily featured may dissuade her from posing for the photo at all.

The use of the hypothetical partner, instead of the image
46
ripped from a magazine (as occurred in Cariou ), leaves the
impression that the problem is only relational (making it appropriate for a privacy tort), so that we needn’t worry about fair
use. But fair use’s transformativeness doctrine specifically favors precisely the kinds of uses that make copyright owners,
and sometimes the subjects of their works, feel bad—critical,
47
mocking, even cruel uses. These fair uses may decrease the
incentive to produce works compared to a world in which criticism wasn’t allowed, but copyright has deliberately chosen not
48
to provide that kind of incentive to authors and owners.
Bambauer proposes to substitute a newsworthiness de49
fense for fair use. That would still seem to spell trouble for
Richard Prince (though maybe not for me), as the specific images of the women in the pictures are unlikely to be newsworthy, though I can imagine some courts contorting themselves to
find newsworthiness based on the women’s prior consent to appear in a soft-core magazine.
50
But newsworthiness isn’t a copyright defense. If fair use
is a poor fit for the interests that the proposal addresses, they
might not be copyright interests. As Bambauer notes, there are
existing causes of action that have newsworthiness defenses
and don’t have fair use defenses. They’re privacy torts, whose
precedent Bambauer suggests courts could incorporate in defin45. See Bambauer, supra note 1, at 2068–67 (footnotes omitted).
46. See Cariou, 714 F.3d at 698.
47. See, e.g., Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 113–14
(2d Cir. 1998).
48. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591–92 (1994)
(“[W]hen a lethal parody, like a scathing theater review, kills demand for the
original, it does not produce a harm cognizable under the Copyright Act. Because ‘parody may quite legitimately aim at garroting the original, destroying
it commercially as well as artistically,’ the role of the courts is to distinguish
between ‘[b]iting criticism [that merely] suppresses demand [and] copyright
infringement[, which] usurps it.’” (citations omitted)).
49. See Bambauer, supra note 1, at 2068.
50. Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 557 (1985).
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51

ing the boundaries of the new defense. But if privacy and
newsworthiness go so well together, what’s wrong with using
the existing privacy torts? Bambauer’s answer is that the trouble lies with existing remedies, to which I now turn.
E. WHAT ARE THE REMEDIES FOR INFRINGEMENT?
1. Statutory Damages
Statutory damages, enforced by private parties, are one
key reason to choose copyright instead of some other law, ac52
cording to Bambauer. But, though Bambauer says “[d]amages
53
would follow copyright’s established system,” he proposes to
change that system. Bambauer notes that getting a lawyer to
take a revenge porn case is difficult, and so is getting a lawyer
54
to take an ordinary copyright case. Some revenge porn cases
won’t involve works that were timely registered (registered before the infringement began or within a few months of publica55
tion), and timely registration is a prerequisite for an award of
statutory damages and attorney’s fees, even assuming that the
56
individual infringer had enough cash to pay an award.
Bambauer would solve this problem by removing the timely
57
registration requirement for statutory damages.

51.
52.
53.
54.

See Bambauer, supra note 1, at 2068.
Id. at 2081.
Id. at 2086.
Cf. MICKEY H. OSTERREICHER & ALICIA WAGNER CALZADA, NAT’L
PRESS PHOTOGRAPHERS ASS’N, COMMENTS OF THE NATIONAL PRESS PHOTOGRAPHERS ASSOCIATION 1 (Oct. 19, 2012), available at http://blogs.nppa.org/
advocacy/files/2012/10/Copyright-Small-Claims-NPPA-Comments-10-19-12r
.pdf (describing photo infringement as rampant online and stating that “copyright infringement is a pernicious problem. Not only has it reduced the profitability of our clients . . . but has also created overly burdensome legal costs
which act as an impediment to pursuing legal remedies in federal court.”).
55. I’m not so sure about this—the works involved in revenge porn cases
may well count as unpublished, as long as the creator didn’t publish them herself. Distribution to a limited group with no purpose of further distribution is
probably not publication. Thus, registration before filing suit might well qualify the victim for statutory damages, assuming she is the copyright owner. See
Deborah R. Gerhardt, Copyright Publication: An Empirical Study, 87 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 135, 147 (2011). And juries probably would consider the awfulness of the disseminator’s harassing and demeaning motive in setting a statutory damage award, even though that’s not generally a factor in copyright
statutory damage awards (again, because revenge porn doesn’t implicate ordinary copyright interests).
56. See Bambauer, supra note 1, at 2065.
57. Id.
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But there is no reason that a standalone, sui generis law
against revenge porn couldn’t also allow for private remedies,
including statutory damages. No reason, that is, other than
§ 230, which would block the imposition of statutory damages
on intermediaries, even ones who refused to honor takedown
requests after a plaintiff succeeded in winning a claim against
58
an unauthorized sharer of intimate media. The sharers themselves, however, could likely be made individually liable for
statutory damages under a specifically drafted law targeting
revenge porn as a privacy tort—this could supplement or re59
place potential criminal liability. At the very least, it would be
fruitful to explore the justifications for and potential arguments
against a sui generis right, as Pam Samuelson and Jerome
Reichman among others have done with respect to other interests that don’t fit well with current intellectual property re60
gimes.
Statutory damages still might not be enough to convince an
attorney to sue a victim’s horrible ex-boyfriend, unless he also
happens to have $150,000 in the bank. Only big firms tend to
seek statutory damages against petty infringers like music
61
uploaders Jammie Thomas and Joel Tenenbaum. There is not
much chance these statutory damages awards will ever be paid,
and the recording industry couldn’t have thought they would
be; its lawyers got paid to send a message.

58. See Global Royalties, Ltd. v. Xcentric Ventures, LLC, 544 F. Supp. 2d
929, 930 (D. Ariz. 2008) (allowing an intermediary to refuse original poster’s
request to take down content and still keep § 230 protection).
59. See Danielle Keats Citron, ‘Revenge Porn’ Should Be a Crime in U.S.,
CNN OPINION (Aug. 30, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/29/opinion/citron
-revenge-porn/index.html?hpt=hp_t4; Mary Anne Franks, Combating NonConsensual Pornography: A Working Paper (Dec. 5, 2013), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2336537 (proposing a draft
criminalization bill).
60. See, e.g., J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property
Rights in Data?, 50 VAND. L. REV. 51, 113–37 (1997) (discussing justifications
for and arguments against sui generis protection for data); Pamela Samuelson
et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 2308, 2310–12 (1994) (arguing for sui generis protection for
computer programs).
61. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in
Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 454
(2009) (noting that in practice statutory damages are mainly sought by large
firms).
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The only predictable, law-abiding deep pockets in this area
belong to intermediaries, which is why Bambauer also suggests
62
changing the law governing them.
2. Intermediary Liability
Bambauer proposes altering 17 U.S.C. § 512, which currently provides a notice and takedown scheme for alleged copy63
right infringement. He suggests that § 512 should be altered
with respect to intimate media specifically, and that this would
be simple to implement because internet service providers are
already familiar with this provision (known as DMCA notice
64
and takedown). The new system would be similar to the existing DMCA, but with different information provision and redaction requirements. It’s not clear whether Bambauer supports
the existing DMCA rule that a counter-notification entitles the
intermediary to restore access to the accused work unless the
65
claimant files suit.
Nor is it clear that Bambauer would allow existing defenses for intermediaries. Compliance with the DMCA provides relief from any money damages that would otherwise be available
to a plaintiff, but, even for non-DMCA compliant services, the
ordinary rules of secondary liability would still require the
plaintiff to establish that the intermediary was contributorily
or vicariously liable for the infringing content before any reme66
dy could be available against the intermediary. A blogger who
allows comments may not have a DMCA agent on file with the
Copyright Office and would therefore be ineligible for DMCA
protection, but the blogger is still not automatically liable for
infringement when a commenter posts infringing material.
Thus, in some circumstances, an intermediary could choose

62. See Bambauer, supra note 1, at 2085.
63. Id. at 2055.
64. Id.; see id. at 2056–69 (describing new system).
65. He speaks of the subject’s written consent as a defense, and of the intermediary’s immunity after complying with a takedown notice as a reason not
to worry about the intermediary’s difficulty in verifying written consent. Id. at
2067. But that just means the intermediary will always take down content
whenever a notice is proper in form, in order to secure that immunity. Should
a counter-notification that claims to have written consent be sufficient to lead
to a “put-back”? The copyright analogy would suggest that the answer is yes,
since the intermediary is in no position to judge the facts.
66. See, e.g., Disney Enters. v. Hotfile Corp., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1309
(S.D. Fla. 2011) (finding Hotfile ineligible for DMCA safe harbor, but not necessarily liable on contributory infringement theory).
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noncompliance with notice and takedown and still avoid liabil67
ity under existing law.
I’m unsure that the problems of intimate media distribution are amenable to the DMCA solution. One major source of
trouble in the sexting realm has been photos shared through
secure messaging services (SMS). Those systems aren’t set up
to make notice and takedown effective, and standard phone
networks that carry SMS don’t meet the underlying standards
for secondary copyright liability (though, again, perhaps
68
Bambauer is also willing to change those). Traditional websites would be covered by this new right, but to the extent that
intimate media circulate in different ways from the average
DMCA target does, that’s a further indication that what we
have isn’t a copyright problem.
F. SUMMARY: A RIGHT GRANTED BY TITLE 17, NOT A
COPYRIGHT
Bambauer proposes a right with a different justification
from copyright, owned by someone other than the ordinary copyright owner, infringed by different acts, with different defenses, and with different remedies. When you’re making this many
changes, it might be time to admit that the proposal does not
involve copyright, but rather a sui generis right placed in Title
17 for another purpose. That purpose, as the next Part explores, is to avoid CDA § 230. This makes his proposal notably
distinct from other not-quite-copyright interventions into the
statute such as microchip design protection or vessel hull design protection.

67. There are other ways to evade liability, of course: not all websites are
amenable to U.S. jurisdiction. See Lorelei Laird, Victims Are Taking on ‘Revenge Porn’ Websites for Posting Photos They Didn’t Consent To, A.B.A. J.,
Nov. 1, 2013, http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/victims_are_taking_
on_revenge_porn_websites_for_posting_photos_they_didnt_c (“It’s an inexpensive way to get photos taken down—if it works. But website operators overseas
or those who believe they’re judgment-proof can and do ignore the [DMCA] notices . . . . And as [Professor Eric] Goldman notes, foreign websites don’t care
about DMCA takedown notices. Indeed, several sites have reportedly moved to
overseas hosts to avoid legal consequences in the U.S.”).
68. See Luvdarts, LLC v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 710 F.3d 1068, 1072–73
(9th Cir. 2013) (holding owners of multimedia messaging networks couldn’t be
held liable for copyright infringement by users; plaintiff couldn’t successfully
allege contributory or vicarious liability).
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II. WHY NOT CALL IT COPYRIGHT?
Why are all these changes required to make revenge porn
fit a copyright model? In this Part, I suggest that renaming the
problem of revenge porn is unlikely to help us solve it. The incentive theory does not justify creating a new intimate media
right in Title 17, because copyright doctrine’s levers for affecting human motivations don’t fit the behaviors at issue, though
privacy law’s might. Copyright law’s present messiness is an
insufficient justification for making so many alterations to copyright’s foundations, and the constitutional issues raised by the
new right will still exist no matter its statutory surrounding.
Finally, calling a new right a “copyright” has risks of its own,
given Bambauer’s desire to evade § 230.
A. NOT ALL INCENTIVES ARE THE SAME

69

This mismatch between copyright’s incentive paradigm
and the benefits of intimate communication isn’t just theoretical or definitional. It can’t be fixed by deciding that we want
70
“copyright” to incentivize more than just expression.
Bambauer writes that “the classic justification for copyright” is
that “the threat of uncontrolled copying deters potential crea71
tors.” The extent to which copyright incentivizes expression in
72
the first place—as opposed to distribution—is hotly contested.
And Bambauer’s description of copyright cuts off the specifically economic rationale of the copyright story: the threat of uncontrolled copying deters potential creators who need or want

69. Bambauer proposes a right to suppress dissemination. This is not necessarily economic in nature, just as there are some personhood-based accounts
of copyright rights that value the right to withhold works. See, e.g., Harper &
Row Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 551 (1985). But it is ultimately enforced by the prospect of damages against ISPs who refuse to honor
takedown notices. See Bambauer, supra note 1, at 2065–66. This is its primary
difference from current law, which is why I speak of economic incentives.
70. See generally Bambauer, supra note 1.
71. Id. at 2038.
72. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Barnett, Copyright Without Creators, 9 REV. L.
& ECON. 389 (2013) (arguing that copyright makes the most sense conceived of
as an incentive for intermediaries to invest in monetization of authors’ creations). Copyright might well use distribution purely instrumentally as a tool to
compensate and incentivize authors. See generally Wendy J. Gordon, Dissemination Must Serve Authors: How the U.S. Supreme Court Erred, 10 REV.
ECON. RES. ON COPYRIGHT ISSUES 1 (2013). My point is that copyright is generally thought of as an incentive for creation because copyright protects works
once publicly disseminated, usually for profit. See id.
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As the Supreme Court ex-

The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to
grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of
individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public
welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in “Science and
useful Arts.” Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities de74
serve rewards commensurate with the services rendered.

This is why copyright provides primarily economic rights,
with only extremely limited moral rights for certain limited75
edition visual works, and why sometimes copyright provides
only compulsory licenses—a right to get paid—instead of a
76
right to control. The right to get paid is deemed sufficient to
induce creation of the kinds of works copyright seeks to incen77
tivize.
Bambauer later gives a more complete account of the conventional justification, noting that:
[a]uthors face the time and expense of creating works initially, and
must price this sunk cost into their per-copy fee (average cost) . . . .
Copyright law is one way out of this dilemma [in which consumers
would prefer to get a copy from a lower-cost copier who didn’t invest
in creation]: it forces consumers to pay the author, at average cost, to
78
bribe the author to produce the work initially.

But, as Bambauer immediately acknowledges, the “time and
expense” faced by the ordinary author creating with the hope of
remuneration is not the same as the intimate risks Bambauer
identifies that might stop a potential creator of intimate media
79
in her tracks. With intimate media, creators aren’t looking to
80
be “bribed” to surrender their photos. Nor are copyists generally looking to sell the photos once acquired.

73. See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, 471 U.S. at 558 (“[T]he Framers
intended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression.”).
74. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (emphasis added).
75. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012).
76. 17 U.S.C. § 114 (2012).
77. Cf. WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP, TECHNOLOGY, LAW,
AND THE FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT (2007) (proposing to replace most of
copyright with compulsory licenses to better fulfill its incentive function in the
digital age).
78. Bambauer, supra note 1, at 2044–45.
79. Id. (“This simple economic story falls apart completely for intimate
media. People create these videos and images for non-pecuniary reasons: to
express affection and lust, to remain connected to an existing partner, to court
a new one.”).
80. Id.
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Even creators of works who intend them to be distributed
are only patchily affected by copyright’s incentives, and the
failure to fit is even greater with intimate works not intended
81
for public distribution. Bambauer’s example of the disparate
use of intimate media by LGBT individuals is an excellent il82
lustration of the issue: it is hard to imagine that sexual identity is correlated with anything copyright might incentivize, or
with knowledge of the difference between the DMCA and § 230
of the CDA. Rather (on the assumption that current law offers
no protection), LGBT individuals may simply be bearing more
risks in their relationships, as they do in many other ways, regardless of the state of intellectual property and privacy law.
But set that all aside for the moment. To get an incentive
effect from an extension of legal protection, people would have
to know the law and believe that they can effectively make use
83
of it if their trust is betrayed. Both of these assumptions are
hard to credit. At the start, there’s the optimism bias
Bambauer discusses: just as most people who get married are
sure that they will not be among the large percentage of couples who divorce, most people who send intimate media are
84
sure they will not be victims of a perfidious partner. ’As one
victim recounted, “He said if I didn’t want to send them to him,
that meant that I didn’t trust him, which meant that I didn’t
85
love him.” As she told the New York Times, even after her experience of having her pictures posted online—which included
being stalked by a stranger—her own friends continued to send
86
nude pictures of themselves to their boyfriends. “You don’t
want to really think that five years down the line, your boyfriend at the time could be your not-boyfriend and do something
87
really bad to you.”

81. See Rebecca Tushnet, Economies of Desire: Fair Use and Marketplace
Assumptions, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513, 513–46 (2009) (discussing nonmonetary incentives for creation); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Copyrights as Incentives: Did We Just Imagine That?, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 29 (2011).
82. Bambauer, supra note 1, at 2034–35.
83. See, e.g., id. at 2048–49 (“[T]he minority of people who sext are well
aware of the risks of doing so. Their numbers would probably grow if those
risks dropped.” (footnote omitted)).
84. Id. at 2042.
85. See, e.g., Erica Goode, Once Scorned, but on Revenge Site, Twice Hurt,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2013, at A11 (quoting victim).
86. Id.
87. Id.
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In addition to the optimism bias, people simply don’t think
about the law when they create intimate media, which means
that increased legal protection wouldn’t spur more creation. In
order for Bambauer’s incentives to work, creators of intimate
media would have to believe that the change in the legal regime
had been absorbed by recipients with enough certainty that the
recipients would be noticeably more likely to hesitate—while in
88
the mood to get revenge—before sharing. It is hard to imagine
a rational calculation in this form: “yes, I don’t trust him all the
way, and he might show the pictures to all his friends, but I’d
be able to sue him and his ISP for damages if he did, so that
89
gives me the extra confidence I need to send the pictures.”
In practice, these calculations aren’t done consciously, but
rather with the aid of background heuristics, expectations, and
assumptions. But those assumptions aren’t likely to be correct.
Misunderstandings about law, particularly intellectual proper90
ty law, are widespread. To the extent that people already believe that their intimate media are legally protected, of course,
they will not be deterred from creating media now, though they
may later be harmed by a relationship betrayal, and they need

88. See generally Bambauer, supra note 1.
89. Cf. id. at 2038–39 (“Romantic partners who understand this legal peculiarity may be deterred from producing intimate media, surrendering a benefit to themselves and, by extension, to society.” (emphasis added)). Bambauer
is skeptical both that no one is deterred from producing intimate media by this
risk and also that the risk is part of the fun for any significant number of producers. Id. at 2085. I’m more unsure; sex has a funny relationship to risk. Carlos Danger/Anthony Weiner, one of Bambauer’s cautionary tales, is a good example: his right to control his media output was irrelevant to what he did, and
we might speculate that compulsion ruled. Id. I don’t contest that believing
that one had perfect control over dissemination could increase creation overall.
Snapchat is popular for a reason. See generally SNAPCHAT, http://www
.snapchat.com (last visited Apr. 21, 2014). But creation stories are often a lot
more complicated than a pure dose-response relationship.
90. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Copyright as Myth, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 235,
237–39 (1991) (describing copyright myths believed by nonlawyers); Cecilia
Ogbu, I Put Up a Website About My Favorite Show and All I Got Was This
Lousy Cease-and-Desist Letter: The Intersection of Fan Sites, Internet Culture,
and Copyright Owners, 12 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 279, 283–85 (2003) (noting
widespread misunderstanding of copyright law); Carolyn Elefant, Judicial
Candidates Brawl over Campaign Slogans, LEGAL BLOG WATCH (Sept. 5,
2008, 3:17 PM), http://legalblogwatch.typepad.com/legal_blog_watch/2008/09/
judicial-candid.html (noting a candidate for judicial office who confuses
trademark claim with copyright claim). See generally PATRICIA EWICK &
SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW: STORIES FROM EVERYDAY LIFE
(1998) (cataloging ways in which lay understandings of law diverge from formal law).
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91

no additional incentive for creation. To the extent that they
don’t understand their rights, the issue is largely one of education, and even a change in the law won’t change that lack of
understanding. The knowledge gap affects both the creators (in
need of incentives) and the unauthorized disseminators (in
92
need of disincentives).
Consider in this context the teenagers who’ve been arrested for disseminating child pornography because they shared in93
timate media, sometimes consensually. Whether the problem
lies in their understanding of the law, or their practical capacity to conform their conduct to the law, an additional civil remedy seems unlikely to deter what criminal law and the prospect
94
of lifetime sex offender registration hasn’t. Nor are most producers of explicit intimate media likely to be complying with 18
U.S.C. § 2257(a), which provides that any person who produces
visual depictions of “actual sexually explicit conduct” must
91. Bambauer argues that a residual right of a recipient to possess intimate media, even after the end of a relationship, is not problematic because
that’s a manageable risk for creators: (1) it’s well-known that former lovers
can hang on to memorabilia, and (2) risk-averse creators can use time-limited
media such as Snapchat. Bambauer, supra note 1, at 2060. As to the former
point, Bambauer’s argument for providing a new right was that it would provide an additional incentive to create intimate media. Id. The problem he
identifies isn’t lack of knowledge of the risk of dissemination, but rather
knowledge and the associated rational response to that risk: limiting production. Id. The same incentive logic would seem to apply to the common
knowledge that memorabilia often outlast a relationship. As to the latter
point, if technological self-help is sufficient to deal with residual risk, why isn’t
it enough to reassure the risk-sensitive people now? After all, Snapchat is
most risk-limiting with respect to short-term or new relationships. See generally supra note 89 and accompanying text. The person who creates intimate
media with or for someone she’s been seeing for five years is less likely to use
Snapchat precisely because she trusts her partner.
92. See generally Bambauer, supra note 1.
93. See, e.g., John A. Humbach, ‘Sexting’ and the First Amendment, 37
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 433 (2010); Beth Defalco, Girl, 14, Arrested over Nude
Pics of Herself, DENVER POST (Mar. 27, 2009), http://www.denverpost
.com/search/ci_12006602; Caroline Zielinski, Teens Arrested over Explicit Photos, AGE VICTORIA (July 3, 2013), http://www.theage.com.au/victoria/teens
-arrested-over-explicit-photos-20130703-2pb65.html.
94. It’s also notable that many people of sexting age probably have downloaded music and/or movies without permission from copyright owners. Kurt
Peters, Technology, Not Ethics, Worry Teens About Illegal Downloading, Study
Says, INTERNET RETAILER (May 21, 2004), http://www.internetretailer.com/
2004/05/21/technology-not-ethics-worry-teens-about-illegal-downloading-s
(finding that over 50% of teens have illegally downloaded music). If people of
sexting age don’t fear statutory damages enough to avoid unauthorized downloads, how likely is it that they’ll fear statutory damages enough to decide
against sharing a sexy photo?
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“create and maintain individually identifiable records pertain95
ing to every performer portrayed.” Many producers and disseminators of intimate media could have bigger problems than
96
copyright, if the law ever came knocking. If we’re really worried about people declining to create intimate media because
they accurately understand the state of the law, we might want
to look at the criminal code first. In truth, as Bambauer says,
“the deterrence story is simply that: a story. It does no real
97
work in changing behavior.” (He says that about the creators
of intimate media, but it is at least as true of the distributors.)
Relatedly, most people never consult lawyers, and most le98
gal wrongs go unredressed in court. Victims may have difficulty finding a lawyer with expertise in the subject. They may
be ashamed of being betrayed, and fear greater exposure if they
sue—this is known as the “Streisand effect” from an early case
in which photos of Barbra Streisand’s house spread more wide95. 18 U.S.C. § 2257(a) (2012). Not all intimate media would qualify: only
“images of intercourse, masturbation, or a ‘lascivious display’ of genitals, as
opposed to nudity or other sexually suggestive poses” are covered by the law.
Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Holder, No. 09-4607, 2013 WL 3761077, at *20 (E.D.
Pa. July 18, 2013). Still, the intimate media Bambauer discusses would apparently include many works also covered by § 2257. A producer subject to § 2257
must “affix[] to every copy of any [visual depiction covered by § 2257] . . . a
statement describing where the records required by [§ 2257] with respect to all
performers depicted in that copy of the matter may be located.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 2257(e)(1). Producers must maintain copies of their performers’ identification documents and make those records available for inspection by the Attorney General. Id. §§ 2257(b)(3), (c). Producers may be exposed to criminal liability if they “fail to create or maintain the records as required” or knowingly
violate other provisions of the law, including knowingly transferring any visual depiction subject to § 2257 that does not contain the required label. Id.
§ 2257(f)(1)–(5).
96. Cf. Connection Distrib. Co. v. Holder, 557 F.3d 321, 336–39 (6th Cir.
2009) (declining to decide whether § 2257 was overbroad as applied to media
created, but not distributed, by couples for their own enjoyment; government
disclaimed intent to enforce law against materials that were never distributed). It’s unclear whether the government’s promise would extend to the kinds
of intimate media sharing Bambauer discusses, though a determined prosecutor could likely proceed in some of the scenarios Bambauer describes.
97. Bambauer, supra note 1, at 2042.
98. Cf. PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE: MEDICAL
INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION 61–76 (1993)
(stating that survey results show that a significant number of medical malpractice victims never file tort claims). See generally ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991) (discussing
general reluctance of many people to litigate disputes even when law is clear);
EWICK & SILBEY, supra note 90 (discussing nonlawyers’ use and understanding of law in ordinary life and unwillingness to use legal system except in rare
circumstances).

2014] HOW MANY WRONGS MAKE A COPYRIGHT?

2367

99

ly as she attempted to suppress them. Many of the victims
whose cases Bambauer discusses would already have been able
to send DMCA takedown notices. In any case in which they
were both the subject and the photographer/videographer (that
is, any case involving a “selfie”), they would already be authors
under current law. Both Bambauer and I agree that the fact
that those victims are also considered “authors” is unrelated to
100
the harm they suffer from unconsented distribution. Nonetheless, it’s notable that lawyers don’t seem to be bringing
droves of copyright infringement lawsuits on behalf of selfie
victims.
Even for existing author-victims, of course, Bambauer’s
proposed reforms could increase the chance of receiving damages from a potentially deep-pocketed intermediary, so perhaps
lawyers would more aggressively seek out clients (though if
there’s widespread compliance with the amended DMCA, then
we’re back to the scenario in which there’s not much money in
101
any given case). My aim in this section is simply to show that
the identification of behaviors we wish to incentivize does not
mean that copyright is an appropriate tool, even if copyright is
also about incentives.
B. TU QUOQUE: IS THIS ANY WORSE THAN WHAT WE ALREADY
HAVE?
Bambauer’s basic response to the distinctions between
what we now call copyright and what he wants to add to Title
17 is to point to the inconsistencies in current copyright law:
[C]opyright is nothing if not a congeries of industry-specific tweaks.
Copyrights in sound recordings do not include a right of public performance—except via digital audio transmission. Architectural works
under copyright have no protection against photographs or pictures
that reproduce a building instantiating the work, so long as that
building is publicly visible. The first sale doctrine lets lawful purchasers rent movie DVDs, but not software DVDs. A small cafe may show
television programming on a set behind the bar [without paying a license fee], but a giant restaurant in Times Square may not—unless it
complies with restrictions on the size and number of televisions and
speakers. Copyright is unprincipled: it is all about special pleading.
99. The “Streisand effect” is the unintentional increased publicity that occurs when one tries to keep something secret. See generally Charles Arthur,
The Streisand Effect: Secrecy in the Digital Age, GUARDIAN, Mar. 18, 2009,
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2009/mar/20/streisand-effect-internet
-law.
100. See generally Bambauer, supra note 1.
101. Id.
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Distortion of an elegant copyright system is not a risk, because it is
102
already distorted.

Indeed, U.S. copyright law has a number of medium- and
industry-specific provisions that mostly can be explained by
lobbying and special pleading. Copyright isn’t pure, so the argument goes, introducing another impurity is not a problem.
At some point, however, impurity converts to a new substance, which is what Bambauer’s proposal does. None of the
provisions Bambauer discusses were introduced merely to circumvent limits on some other right, which is why none of them
required wholesale changes in every aspect of copyright—the
addition of a digital public performance right for sound recordings, for example, did not require a change in authorship rules,
103
liability standards, or fair use defenses. Nor did the extension
of protection to architectural works (required by our accession
104
to the Berne Convention).
Relatedly, all of these are industry-specific tweaks, directed at the economic needs and market configurations that
were current at the moment the legislature acted. They aren’t
content-based. By contrast, the intimate media right isn’t about
the business deals and compromises made by any industry. It’s
about protecting a privacy interest. If an intimate media right
is a copyright, I have difficulty seeing the barriers to giving a
victim of defamation a copyright, or even doing the same for
105
any subject of a work, defamatory or not. Authorship may be
102. Id. at 2076 (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 2053 (noting existence of
overlapping claims in the current system).
103. The closest analogy is probably the Vessel Hull Design Protection Act
(VHDPA), which created an extremely limited right to prevent copying of otherwise unprotectable boat hulls. See Vessel Hull Design Protection Act, Pub.
L. No. 105-304, §§ 501–502, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C.
§§ 1301–1332 (2012)). This provision, which is essentially and well-deservedly
unused, does not strike me as a model to be emulated. In practical terms, proponents of expanding the law to protect fashion designs have faced controversy
that have so far blocked change, even though the VHDPA was written precisely so that it could later be expanded to cover other subject matter. See 17
U.S.C. § 1301(b)(1); Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV.
1687, 1754 (2006). Regardless of the merits of fashion design rights, the history of this provision indicates that putting a new right in the Copyright Act
doesn’t go unnoticed, and that the label “copyright” doesn’t refute the legal
and policy arguments deployed against expansion.
104. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012); see also 1990 H.R. REP. NO. 101-735
(1990), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6936–37.
105. See Susan Corbett, The Case for Joint Ownership of Copyright in Photographs of Identifiable Persons, MEDIA & ARTS L. REV. (forthcoming Dec.
2013), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=23433
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a highly flexible concept, but that doesn’t make it entirely
meaningless.
I’m a fan of categorical thinking. It can make sense to
group “games” together even if we can say that chess doesn’t
share any significant characteristics with bouncing a ball, as
long as each game has family resemblances to other games in
106
the group. Still, there is a difference between a concept with a
wide range of reasonable meanings and a concept that has been
107
completely emptied out. To my mind, calling an intimate media right “copyright” would tilt too far to the latter.
C. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE NEW SYSTEM
Bambauer is aware that he’s suggesting some radical revisions. Among the consequences is the potential vulnerability of
his new right to a First Amendment challenge, even though
copyright laws are generally unproblematic under current doc108
trine. Bambauer suggests that his proposal would be constitutionally suspect if called a privacy right, but that the relaxed
scrutiny given to copyright laws would protect this new right if
109
it were called copyright. However, no judge is that bald-faced
110
about formalism, as Bambauer recognizes.
The Supreme
Court has specifically identified fair use as a key constitutional
limit on copyright, and his proposal removes fair use as a de111
fense.
Because the “traditional contours” of copyright would be altered in every particular by the new intimate media right, some
112
other kind of First Amendment scrutiny would have to apply.
Bambauer suggests that his proposed newsworthiness defense
would suffice to allow the new right to survive First Amend57 (advocating that all photographic subjects should have copyrights in photos
of them).
106. See GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT
CATEGORIES REVEAL ABOUT THE MIND (1987); LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 66 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 3d ed. 1958).
107. Cf. Don Herzog, As Many as Six Impossible Things Before Breakfast,
75 CAL. L. REV. 609, 629 (1987) (arguing that, even if there are plausible arguments over constitutional meaning, it would be a misreading of the Constitution to read it “as the story of a small boy growing up in Kansas”).
108. See generally Bambauer, supra note 1.
109. Id. at 2078–84.
110. See id.
111. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219–20, 222 (2003) (stating that copyright is, absent alterations to its “traditional contours,” constitutionally unproblematic).
112. Id. at 221.
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ment scrutiny, based on precedent from privacy cases. Here,
the snake swallows its own tail, formalism (copyright is a First
Amendment-free zone) converting to functionalism (newsworthiness is an appropriate defense) just at the point at which
Bambauer acknowledges that labels can’t be dispositive.
Bambauer offers the following dichotomy: “copyright is left
with an uncomfortable dilemma: either the line of cases finding
newsworthiness to be adequate free speech protection in other
contexts is misguided, or fair use must be analyzed formalisti114
cally.” There’s another alternative, which is that copyright is
doing different things than other laws, requiring different First
Amendment limits. One could equally assert that fair use in
every copyright case, including Prince v. Cariou as it was actually litigated, could constitutionally be replaced by newsworthiness, or by the constitutionally required limits on defama115
tion. One could also argue that the requirements of falsity
and malice for defamation could be replaced with fair use’s consideration of transformativeness and market harm. Those
switches don’t make sense, however, because the justifications
for the rights, and correspondingly the interests involved on
both sides, differ.
Current precedents from the privacy torts could make
newsworthiness a sufficient First Amendment limit on the new
intimate media right, certainly as applied to individual
116
uploaders. But a key question, unanswered by Bambauer’s
analysis, is how newsworthiness would interact with new forms
of dissemination. Newsworthiness case law developed in the
context of traditional publishers’ deliberate selections of what
to publish. Imposing liability on ISPs for non-newsworthy im113. Bambauer, supra note 1, at 2078–84.
114. Id. at 2083–84.
115. Cf. Prince v. Cariou, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013).
116. A case he cites with favor, Toffoloni v. LFP Publishing Group, 572
F.3d 1201 (11th Cir. 2009), has very weak reasoning. See Bambauer, supra
note 1, at 2083. Upholding a privacy claim against the publication of nude
photos, though not against the publication of text about the photos, the
Toffoloni court declined to give any weight to the veridical effects of the photos. Toffoloni, 572 F.3d at 1213. This is not to say that other courts won’t follow that reasoning. Courts are often willing to treat images as worthless, unless they’re treating them as ineffable. See Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a
Thousand Words: The Images of Copyright, 125 HARV. L. REV. 683, 707, 708 &
n.112 (2012). For these purposes, I simply wish to note that what Bambauer
presents as a descriptive claim—the case law suggests that his proposed new
right is constitutional—ends up having strong normative implications as well:
suppressing images is no great loss. But see generally Bambauer, supra note 1.
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ages disseminated by their users is not obviously constitutional, certainly not when it comes to vicarious liability, which
117
doesn’t require knowledge. In general, the Supreme Court
has been wary of liability for speech distributors in the absence
118
of fault. Even if this new right might be constitutional as applied to perfidious individuals, then, the key part of the remedy—its extension to intermediaries, which defeats § 230’s immunity—might not be.
D. ME TOO: OTHER CANDIDATES FOR “COPYRIGHT” EXTENSION
Bambauer notes that we’ve increased copyright enforcement and remedies in order to go after massive online copying,
without particular evidence that this helped copyright own119
ers. Thus, he concludes, we need not be sure that his pro120
posed reform would work before we enact it. I don’t find that
analogy persuasive. It seems to me to be an argument about
industry capture, not about good policy. However, the comparison does strengthen my fear that any rights given to subjects of
intimate media will be demanded on fairness and economic incentive grounds by other groups much better positioned to
make incentive-based claims as rational economic actors seeking only profit maximization. Given the expansions in the scope
of copyright rights and remedies required to make Bambauer’s
new right effective, the likely demands for parity between existing copyright rights and new intimate media rights strike me
as undesirable side effects of putting his proposed new right in
Title 17.
117. See Seth F. Kreimer, Censorship by Proxy: The First Amendment, Internet Intermediaries, and the Problem of the Weakest Link, 155 U. PA. L. REV.
11 (2006); Edward Lee, Freedom of the Press 2.0, 42 GA. L. REV. 309 (2008)
(arguing that the First Amendment puts constitutional limits on intermediary
liability even in copyright).
118. E.g., United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 72 n.2, 76
n.5 (1994) (stating that the First Amendment requires that a distributor must
know the victim’s age to support a conviction for distributing child pornography; producers are in a unique position to verify age, and distributors are not);
Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959) (holding that liability for distributing
obscenity requires scienter). Section 2257 of Title 18, mentioned above, also
avoids constitutional problems by specifically limiting the obligations of nonproducer disseminators—they can only be liable for knowingly selling or transferring materials without the requisite labels indicating that the producer
kept the appropriate age and identity records. In addition, they have “no duty
to determine the accuracy of the contents of the statement or the records required to be kept.” 18 U.S.C. § 2257(f)(4) (2012).
119. Bambauer, supra note 1, at 2050.
120. Id.
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I find particularly puzzling Bambauer’s contention that using copyright would solve the problem of § 230:
[U]sing IP law effectively addresses issues with intimate media within the existing statutory framework for Internet intermediaries. Other approaches, such as privacy-based ones, would need to alter the
contours of the immunity for interactive computer services from
third-party liability created by Section 230 . . . . Some of these proposals would not merely alter Section 230, they would eviscerate it.
This is undesirable. Section 230 has been critical to the development
of a thriving Internet ecosystem based largely on content supplied by
121
users.

But Bambauer’s proposal isn’t operating in secret. It’s perfectly
obvious that his new right is designed to evade § 230. He even
122
touts that as a virtue. Yet other claimants are equally capable of deploying formalist concepts to serve realist ends. Any attempt to enact this proposal would give everyone whose ox is
gored by § 230 an opportunity to show up and argue that their
interests should be considered “copyright” interests too, at least
for purposes of avoiding § 230, since we’re already doing a lot of
tailoring of “copyright” to deal with intimate media. I can see
no functional or political difference between amending Title 17
to evade § 230 and amending § 230 itself. Either intermediaries
depend on § 230 and we should leave it alone, or we should be
willing to tweak it to impose a new duty on them because revenge porn is so bad.
Beyond § 230, many other claimants would have an interest in getting the benefits of this new right’s divergence from
existing copyright rights. For example, proponents of publicity
rights could ask why other, nonsexual portrayals wouldn’t jus123
tify similar veto rights (subject to a newsworthiness defense).
Additionally, Jessica Silbey’s empirical work reveals a strong
desire for more rights to control reputation among creators;
many of them would welcome a new moral right of withdraw124
al. Copyright owners of all stripes would also love to have a
new right to control, and therefore monetize, private performance and display. If this is a copyright, after all, then other
copyright owners have similarly (and more plausibly incentivebased) claims for control.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. at 2054.
Id. at 2055.
See Corbett, supra note 105.
JESSICA SILBEY, HARVESTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: IP INTERVENTIONS AND THE ROLES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES IN CREATIVE AND
INNOVATIVE WORK (forthcoming 2013) (arguing that creators withhold works
from certain markets because they fear loss of control).
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Likewise, many copyright owners would be thrilled to get
rid of the timely registration requirement for statutory damages. Most small copyright owners—precisely the group unlikely
to timely register—have the same difficulties as victims of revenge porn in finding legal representation, and thus an equally
compelling argument for extension of this new remedy to
125
them. And copyright owners hate the burdens placed on them
by the DMCA’s notice and takedown requirements, which they
perceive as forcing them into an endless game of whack-a126
mole. If we’re creating a new notice and takedown scheme
with different contours, surely their desires should be taken into account as well.
CONCLUSION
Bambauer’s paper challenges us to navigate the is and the
ought: whatever copyright ought to be, he argues, is less important for people interested in protecting victims of nonconsensual exposure than what it is, which cannot be known at a
conceptual level but can only be observed from the actual
messy contours of copyright and therefore can be changed in
127
order to serve any reasonable purpose. But categories, however imperfect, exist for reasons—reasons that even realists
generally acknowledge. Contradictions and inconsistencies are
inevitable, but that doesn’t mean they’re all of equal worth.
Bambauer’s claim that copyright can be whatever we want as
long as we mention incentives seems to me not to be useful, in
Felix Cohen’s formulation: “a definition is useful if it insures
against risks of confusion more serious than any that the defi-

125. See, e.g., OSTERREICHER & CALZADA, supra note 54, at 7.
126. For a very small but representatively vituperative set of criticisms,
see Broadcast Music Inc., Comments of Broad. Music, Inc. on Dep’t of Commerce Copyright Green Paper, at 13–14, available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/
files/ntia/bmi_comments.pdf; Global Intellectual Property Ctr., Chamber of
Commerce, GIPC Comments to DOC on Digital Copyright Issues, at 6–7,
available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/global_intellectual_property_
center_comments.pdf; Indep. Film & Television Alliance, Comments of IFTA,
at 5–6, available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/independent_film_and_
television_association_comments.pdf; Nat’l Music Publishers’ Ass’n et al.,
Comments of Nat’l Music Publishers’ Ass’n et al., at 14–15, available at
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/national_music_publishers_association_et._
al._comments.pdf; Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., Inc., Comments of the Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., Inc., at 4, available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/
files/ntia/recording_industry_association_of_america_comments.pdf.
127. See generally, Bambauer, supra note 1.
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nition itself contains.” A more productive debate would consider a right against revenge porn, and the relationship between individual and intermediary liability for revenge porn,
on its own merits.

128. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 836 (1935).

